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Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) enter a rapid growth era due to their attrac-
tive flexibility and CMOS-compatible fabrication process. However, the increasing popu-
larity and usage of FPGAs bring in some security concerns, such as intellectual property
privacy, malicious stealthy design modification, and leak of confidential information. To
address the security threats on FPGA systems, majority of existing efforts focus on coun-
teracting the reverse engineering attacks on the downloaded FPGA configuration file or
the retrieval of authentication code or crypto key stored on the FPGA memory. In this
thesis, we extensively investigate new potential attacks originated from the untrusted
computer-aided design (CAD) suite for FPGAs. We further propose a series of counter-
measures to thwart those attacks. For the scenario of using FPGAs to replace obsolete ag-
ing components in legacy systems, we propose a Runtime Pin Grounding (RPG) scheme
to ground the unused pins and check the pin status at every clock cycle, and exploit the
principle of moving target defense (MTD) to develop a hardware MTD (HMTD) method
against hardware Trojan attacks. Our method reduces the hardware Trojan bypass rate
by up to 61% over existing solutions at the cost of 0.1% more FPGA utilization. For gen-
eral FPGA applications, we extend HMTD to a FPGA-oriented MTD (FOMTD) method,
which aims to thwart FPGA tool induced design tampering. Our FOMTD is composed of
three defense lines on user constraints file, random design replica selection, and runtime
xiii
submodule assembling. Theoretical analyses and FPGA emulation results show that the





1.1 Trend of FPGA Utilization
Field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) as a group of programmable integrated cir-
cuitries are famous for their flexibility, low cost and efficiency. The programmable archi-
tecture and internal connection allow any functions of an ASIC to be realized in a FPGA
chip. In fact, FPGAs have played very important roles in many fields. Both the usage and
popularity of FPGAs kept increasing in the past several decades and it is reasonable to
expect a even better trend of its development. In 2016, according to the data provided by
[1], the FPGA market was already valued at USD 5.34 Billion and in 2023, this number is
expected to be increasing to 9.50 Billion. The great amount of FPGA applications covering
a variety of areas make a great contribution to the FPGA market size. The applications
are broadly distributed in Aerospace, high performance computing, wireless commu-
nication, and security including, in detail, digital signal processing, ASIC prototyping,
super computer, etc. FPGA can be widely involved in the designs of electronic systems
because of its programmable and parallel nature, the low cost of updating compared to
1
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FIGURE 1.1: Security threats to FPGA system [3]
ASIC, and easy-to-design property for faster time-to-market [2]. However, nothing is per-
fect. Besides so many above mentioned advantages, FPGA systems can also face security
problems.
1.2 Security Concerns on FPGA Applications
The security threats to FPGA systems can be from both the FPGA device and the supply
chain including intellectual property (IP) theft, reverse engineering, logic tempering, and
hardware Trojan [3] as can be seen in the figure 1.1. The rapidly increasing speed of FPGA
market size can also bring some security issues because it also attracts attackers’ attention
for the high improper interest which may be obtained once the FPGA applications are
manipulated.
Although many protections schemes have been developed to address the security con-
cerns, there are still some blind spots being ignored. If we can detect those unrevealed
potential security vulnerabilities, we are going to make a contribution for keeping the de-
velopment of FPGA systems along a healthy path. In this thesis, we focus on hardware
2
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FIGURE 1.2: Potential security vulnerability in FPGA supply chain
Trojan attacks on FPGA systems and reveal that one potential security threat can be from
the FPGA design software, which is usually called a CAD tool. Figure 1.2 shows a basic
FPGA supply chain and we doubt the reliability of the CAD tool during the stage that
after it is developed but before it is used. Furthermore, we propose a series of counter-
measures to thwart this type of attacks.
1.3 Key Contributions
To address the security threat discussed in the previous section, we propose our protec-
tion mechanisms to thwart the attacks of hardware Trojan which is inserted through a
untrusted CAD tool. More specifically, our main contributions are as follows.
1. We investigate new potential attacks originated from the untrusted FPGA design
software and further propose a series of countermeasures to thwart those attacks.
2. To removed the security concerns when replacing obsolete aging components in
legacy systems with FPGAs, we propose a RPG scheme to ground the unused pins
3
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and check the pin status at every clock cycle, and exploit the principle of MTD to
develop a HMTD method against hardware Trojan attacks.
3. For general FPGA applications, we extend HMTD to a FOMTD method, which aims
to thwart FPGA tool-induced design tampering, FOMTD is composed of three de-
fense lines in the user constraints file, random design replica selection, and runtime
submodule assembling to defend the attacks from three different levels.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, an overview of FPGA architec-
ture and the FPGA design suite will be introduced. Then we will talk about some existing
research on the security problems of FPGA systems and a classic moving target defense
countermeasure will be illustrated.
In Chapter 3, we address the security problems of using FPGAs to replace the aging
components of legacy system.
1. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that investigates the countermea-
sure against the security threats that occur during the FPGA deployment for legacy
systems. The primary goal of this work is to address the security attacks from the
untrusted FPGA vendor and the CAD tools for FPGA configuration, rather than the
IP piracy and side-channel attacks on FPGAs.
2. We propose a RPG scheme. Compared with the conceptual proposal in [4], we im-
plemented the pin grounding concept on a Nexys-3 Spartan-6 FPGA board that suc-
cessfully prevents the communication between the external environment and the
4
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FPGA device. Moreover, our scheme additionally performs runtime checking to ex-
amine whether all user-unused I/O pins are truly grounded at every clock cycle,
thus thwarting the countermeasure mutation by the FPGA CAD tool.
3. We propose a HMTD method. In our method, the hardware description of the aged
functional module in the legacy system is replicated multiple times. Two of the
replicas are randomly selected by an on-chip random number generator to examine
the consistency between the two groups of outputs. Furthermore, instead of leav-
ing the FPGA CAD tool to place and route the replacement module with default
settings, we propose to explicitly specify the slice physical distance between the
replicas in a FPGA user constraint file. Our method is able to thwart the stationary
hardware Trojan insertion by the CAD tool.
In Chapter 4, we continue to work on the security vulnerabilities of the CAD tool and
propose corresponding countermeasures to create unpredictabilities to the attacker.
1. We exploit the principles of moving target defense (MTD) and propose a FPGA-
oriented MTD (FOMTD) countermeasure to resist the attacks from malicious FPGA
tools. To the best of our knowledge, this work together with our prior work [5]
are the first attempt to assess the feasibility of applying the MTD concept to defeat
hardware Trojans from malicious FPGA software.
2. We propose three defense lines to generate three types of unpredictabilities to
thwart the stealthy modification from compromised FPGA software.




In Chapter 5, the main contributions of the thesis are summarized and future work





FPGA’s reconfigurable architecture, which is illustrated in figure 2.1, allows it to be pro-
grammed after fabrication to perfectly mimic almost any logic functions that basic dig-
ital circuits can do. A standard FPGA is usually composed of three portions which are
programmable logic blocks, programmable interconnections, and I/O blocks plus some
additional advanced on-chip integrated circuitries, such as ALUs, block RAM, or DSP-48,
for corresponding specific operations [6].
In general, programmable logic blocks are mainly made of look up tables (LUTs)
which can complete combinational logics efficiently and flip-flops/latches. Figure 2.2
shows the LUTs and flip-flops in one slice of a Xilinx FPGA. The programmable rout-




FIGURE 2.1: FPGA internal architecture [6]
2.2 FPGA Design Suite
FPGA behavior is driven by a bitsream file which is generated through FPGA design
suite CAD software. Two main FPGA design suites in the market are Xilinx ISE and
Altera Quartus. The design flows in these two kinds of CAD tools have some common
features, as shown in figure 2.3. In Xilinx ISE [7], the design programmed in hardware
design language is first synthesized. The output file of this stage will be combined with
user constraints to be send to NGDBuild. After this step, the translated design is mapped
then placed and routed according to the specified FPGA device. Finally, bitstream will
generated. A similar procedure can also be performed in Altera Quartus in command
line by quartus_map, quartus_fit, quartus_tan, and quartus_asm [8].
8
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FIGURE 2.2: Architectures of Xilinx LUT and flip-flop
2.3 Existing Researches on FPGA Security
2.3.1 IP Piracy
Intellectual property (IP) of an electronic design always carries the key knowledge and
technique of the research team who developed it. This also makes it become the target
9
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FIGURE 2.3: Typical FPGA configuration flow [8]
of attackers because by pirating the IP, attackers have a chance to significantly reduce the
cost of developing an original one including money, time and research effort. In [9], it has
already been proven that it is feasible to extract the FPGA design of IP using a Xilinx ISE
FPGA design suite.
There are also some countermeasures being proposed to protect the IP integrity of FP-
GAs. A group of traditional countermeasures for IP piracy is watermarking. In [10], a
method is presented which generates the watermarking for helping to identify the au-
thorship of the design by manipulating the state transition graph to make it create a very
10
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rare property. In this way, the watermarking can be very hard to be removed. A novelty
PUF-FSM binding protection mechanism, in which a FSM is embedded in IP and it is acti-
vated by the response from the PUF embedded in FPGA, is proposed in [11] to restrict the
IP to be only executed in an authorized FPGA device to avoid the IP being pirated. The
approach demonstrated in [12] also provides a novel approach of device identification
which proposes to assign each FPGA device a unique architecture and the architecture
information will be used to encrypt the bitstream. By doing this, only the authorized de-
vice can work with the encrypted the bitstream so that the economic motivation of reverse
engineering IP will be reduced.
2.3.2 Hardware Trojan
Hardware Trojan is another group of security threats which can be harmful for FPGA
designs. The Trojans as extra and malicious circuitries can be inserted to FPGA systems
through the vulnerable stages of FPGA design flow [13]. The purpose of a hardware Tro-
jan can be disrupt the normal operation or leaking significant information and different
with non-programmable devices, the hardware Trojans in FPGA can impact the design
after configuration by exploiting the programmability. A taxonomy of FPGA-specified
hardware Trojans is provided in [13]. It categorizes the Trojan into two main groups in
terms of their triggers and payloads, as shown in figure 2.4.
The Morph Onion-encryption Replication partially runtime reconfiguration (PRR) hard-
ware abstraction layer (HAL) (MORPH) architecture proposed in [14] is a very good
defense mechanism, as shown in figure 2.5. It combines multiple levels of protections
schemes including morph operation, onion encryption, replication, PRR as well as HAL
and is able mitigate the Trojan from both fabrication-time and design-time. To solved
11
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FIGURE 2.4: Taxonomy of FPGA-specific hardware Trojans [13]
the problem that hardware Trojan insertion protection may leave chip resources unused
for attackers to manipulate, a solution is proposed in [15] which fills up the unoccupied
space with low-level dummy logics. By doing this, there is no room in the bitstream
of design for hardware Trojan insertion anymore. Adapted triple modular redundancy
(ATMR) is another effective countermeasure to mitigate hardware Trojan attacks. In [13],
a specific taxonomy of FPGA-based hardware Trojan attacks is first illustrated and in
which the attacks are categorized according to the trigger and payload. Then a Adapted
TMR aiming at detecting the hardware Trojan on chip is presented which replicates the
design into three copies and the third copy is only activated when mismatch is found be-
tween first two. In [16], a Hardware Trojan Threats (HTT) detectability metric (HDM) is
proposed to detect hardware Trojan in which the normalized physical parameters, such
as power consumption and timing variation, will be weighted combined to be compared
with threshold. If the combined result value is higher than the threshold, the FPGA will
be determined to be malicious.
12
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FIGURE 2.5: Taxonomy of FPGA-specific hardware Trojans [14]
2.3.3 Side Channel Analysis
Side channel analysis is one type of serious security problems, which is mainly composed
of power analysis, timing analysis and electromagnetic emanation analysis [17], for dig-
ital circuits because of its ability to extract data and it also commonly threatens FPGA
systems. There are also existing solutions to deal with this threat. A fake key based
countermeasure is introduced in [18], in which a runtime changed fake key is randomly
selected to perform the AES algorithm aiming at confusing the attacker. Extracting data
by running SCA, no matter power consumption analysis or electromagnetic radiation
analysis, on the fake AES algorithm cannot provide attackers any important information
about the protection method. In the method proposed in [19], an interfering power signal
is generated by a uncorrelated power noise generator according to the manipulated data
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and an interfering key. The aim of doing this is to let the interfering power signal inter-
fere with the attacker’s analysis by breaking the correlation between the power measured
and the encryption key. An asynchronous FPGA architecture, SCAR-FPGA, is designed
in [20] to thwart power-based side channel attacks. It is based on pre-charged logic and a
proposed LUT structure that can help balance the power consumption when reading the
values “1" and “0" so that it generates data-independent power signal.
2.4 Moving Target Defense
2.4.1 Principle of MTD
The key idea of the whole protection system proposed in this thesis is based on the clas-
sic moving target defense method. It can be well illustrated with a “shell game" [21].
The game host randomly switches the positions of the shells to mess up the inference
of audience about which one the ball is covered with. Moving target defense has been
broadly used in the designs of protection for electronic systems. The key idea of it is de-
veloped into dynamically shifting the attacker surfaces, such as network IP address and
port conditions, to increase the unpredictability, complexity and cost to attackers when
implementing attacks.
2.4.2 MTD Applications in Electronic Systems
The method of moving target defense has been implemented in electronic systems in
varies of domains. In [22], moving target defense is developed to mitigate the privacy-
related attacks in IPv6 by reducing the ability of attackers to determine the two commu-
nicating hosts. In [23], the idea of moving target defense is adopted to thwart distributed
14
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FIGURE 2.6: MIGRATE Architecture [24]
denial of service attacks. A MIGRATE, as shown in figure 2.6, is proposed in [24] which
is a real-time moving target defense for creating obfuscations to defend the co-residency
side channel attacks on computing clouds. The proposed countermeasures in the thesis
are also inspired by moving target defense and develop the idea of it to provide better




Component Replacement for Legacy
Systems
3.1 Motivation
The lifetime of electronics systems is always expected to be long in civil use, industry, mil-
itary, etc. In a legacy system, component-aging is unavoidable and some electronic com-
ponents may experience aging earlier than others. Unfortunately, the aged components
may no longer be manufactured or available on the market. A straightforward solution
is to re-design the entire system, but the total cost for re-designing, testing, and instal-
lation could be 10 times that of other alternatives, such as component replacement [25].
An obsolete component can be substituted by an equivalent device from gray market,
application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), field-programmable gate array (FPGA) [26],
or uncommitted logic array (ULA).
Traditionally, functionality matching is the primary focus when we replace the aged
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module with a functional equivalent. Little or no attention is paid to the security threats
originated from the component replacement. Unfortunately, the trustworthiness of the
FPGA supply chain has become a serious concern now, so it is imperative to address those
security threats, in particular, from untrusted FPGA manufacturers and computer-aided
design (CAD) tools associated with FPGA deployment.
3.2 Existing Solutions
Many protection schemes have been proposed to protect against FPGA security threats.
To detect the hardware Trojans carried in the FPGA configuration bitstream, Chakraborty
et al. [4] suggest the following: grounding the unused I/O pins; monitoring the temper-
ature of the FPGA device; filling up the unused resources of the FPGA; or scrambling
the bitstream file. Bloom et al. [27] propose to morph on-chip resources for moving tar-
get defense (MTD) against fabrication-time Trojans. Their method heavily utilizes en-
cryption on the FPGA configuration for initialization boot and hardware description of
functional modules. Moreover, process memory, L1 cache, and L2 cache are encrypted
separately using multi-layer encryption. Although the alteration of two instances for the
same CPU implementation can thwart random hardware Trojans, the multi-layer encryp-
tion is too costly for many real-time systems. The ideas proposed in [4] and [27] remain at
the conceptual level, and no practical experiments have been conducted to demonstrate
the method’s feasibility.
To protect the FPGA configuration bitstream against piracy, reverse engineering, and
tampering, Karam et al. [28] obfuscate the FPGA bitstream by inserting additional func-
tions in the look-up tables (LUTs) that are configured for the true functionality of the
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design. Jyothi et al. [29] utilize ring-oscillator arrays to measure process variation among
FPGA slices, which may be modified by the untrusted FPGA manufacturer. Then, the
FPGA region where the process variation is below the acceptable threshold is identified
as a trust zone. The authors place the hardware design only in the trusted FPGA zones.
This method assumes that the malicious FPGA slices lead to significant changes in delay,
and the FPGA CAD tool is trusted. Mal-Sarkar et al. [13] propose an adapted triple mod-
ular redundancy (ATMR) technique to detect the hardware Trojan inserted in one of the
design replicas. To reduce the overhead on power consumption, the third replica is acti-
vated once the output mismatch is detected from the other two replicas. The limitation of
this method is that the three copies of the design module are allocated by the FPGA CAD
tool in a stationary manner. Because the untrusted CAD tool has the prior knowledge
of the place and route rules, theoretically, the tool can insert the same Trojan in the two
replicas of the design. Thus, the ATMR method may not detect the Trojan.
The aforementioned methods assume that the FPGA CAD tool is trusted. These meth-
ods do not consider the scenarios in which hardware Trojans in the bitstream configura-
tion can be inserted during the place and route stage. Another challenge is how to prevent
the countermeasure from being removed/muted by the untrusted FPGA CAD tool.
3.3 Proposed Method
To address the security concerns discussed in the previous section, we propose a frame-
work to detect the hardware Trojan inserted by an untrusted FPGA manufacturer or CAD
tools. The proposed countermeasure, which is composed of two parts: (1) RPG and (2)
HMTD, protects against the hardware Trojan attacks by appending commands in user
18


























FIGURE 3.1: Overview of proposed countermeasure to secure the FPGA re-
placement for a legacy system. To replace the aged module (MTR), the pro-
posed method connects a group of FPGA modules (HMTD+Rin+Rout+CCU)
to the original modules U1 and U2 in the legacy system.
constraints file and modifying the original Verilog design files. The RPG scheme is to ter-
minate the hardware Trojans that communicate with the external environment through
unused I/O pins on the FPGA device. The HMTD method prevents the Trojan horses in-
duced by the malicious FPGA CAD tools from interfering with the FPGA replacement in
legacy systems. Figure 3.1 depicts the overview of the proposed countermeasure against
hardware Trojans on the FPGA device.
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3.3.1 Proposed Runtime Pin Grounding
Inspired by the idea proposed in [4], we apply the pin grounding scheme to the unused
FPGA I/O pins by using a user constraint file. In this work, we continue to use the
Nexys-3 FPGA board to introduce the procedure of our RPG scheme. This scheme is
implemented in the top level of the hardware description module as shown in the black
shadowed area of Fig. 3.1.
First, we assign every unused pin a net name in the top level of the hardware design
file. Then, each NET name is linked with an unused I/O pin in the user constraint file by
using the command (1).
NET “net_name" LOC = pin_name (1)
After that, we proceed to ground those I/O pins through the command (2).
NET “net_name" PULLDOWN (2)
Even if we have grounded all of the unused pins through the user constraint file, the
malicious FPGA CAD tool can alter the user-specified pin configuration by modifying the
native circuit description (.ncd) file. This phenomenon has been observed in our FPGA
deployment environment Xilinx ISE 14.1 [30] when we manually ground the pin reserved
for the power supply. Because the .ncd file is not readable, the hardware Trojans placed
by the CAD tool are stealthy. To thwart the unrevealed modification from the CAD tool,
we enhance our pin grounding scheme by adding a runtime detection circuit. Since we
have assigned a net name for each unused I/O pin, we can simply use the logic of NOR
to examine the grounding status of those unused pins.
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FIGURE 3.2: Detailed slice assignment shown in the FPGA Editor. The two
red dots represents the locations for the two replicas of MTR equivalence that
are specified in our method through FPGA Editor.
3.3.2 Proposed Hardware Moving Target Defense
To prevent the malicious CAD tool from successfully sabotaging the original FPGA con-
figuration, we use the principle of MTD to develop the HMTD method. We assume that
the functionality of the module-to-replace (MTR) in the legacy system is known by the
FPGA deployment team, who is trusted. Our HMTD method replicates the MTR into
multiple copies CP0, CP1, · · · , CPj . We use the “RLOC" command to specify the relative
physical distance between two replicas in the user constraint file. For instance, we can
assign CP0 and CP1 to the two corners of the FPGA device by setting RLOC = X36Y61
and RLOC = X1Y60, respectively. Alternatively, we can utilize the FPGA Editor tool to
perform the similar operation. Figure 3.2 shows that two replicas of MTR equivalent are
successfully placed to two FPGA corners by our method.
In the next step, we add a low-cost, random number generator in the Rin unit to se-
lect two replicas of the function module to feed the N-bit inputs from U2 in the legacy
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FIGURE 3.3: Flowchart of proposed hardware moving defense method.
system. This setting is essentially a power-gating technique to reduce the power con-
sumption. For sequential circuits, state restore will be required in order to use the input
gating technique. Note that the random number generator is implemented on the FPGA,
and thus the random selection is performed at runtime. The random number generator
also controls the Rout unit to choose which two replicas for the Trojan detection in the
consistency checking unit (CCU). Once the output inconsistency is found, the M-bit out-
put pins are grounded immediately and the flag for the Trojan detection is turned on. The
flowchart of our HMTD method is summarized in Fig. 3.3.
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3.4 Experiment Results
3.4.1 Experimental Setup
The following experiments were performed on the Nexys-3 Board, which contains a Xil-
inx Spartan-6 XC6SLX16 CSG324C FPGA. This FPGA device includes 324 I/O pins (232
of which are user I/O pins) and 2,278 slices, each containing four 6-input LUTs and eight
flip-flops. We used the Xilinx ISE 14.1 version to synthesize, place and route the Verilog
HDL design files and generate bitstreams. The hardware overhead assessment was based
on the ISCAS’85 benchmark circuits. We inserted the hardware Trojans on the FPGA
device through two techniques: one is through the FPGA Editor, and the other is via edit-
ing the native circuit description file. Both of these techniques do not require changing
the Verilog HDL file of the function module. The slice assignment shown in the FPGA
Editor (see Fig. 3.4(a)) demonstrates that the FPGA CAD tool can successfully alter the
configuration of one unused FPGA slice without disturbing the logic netlist. Although a
native circuit description (.ncd) file is not readable, we can use an xdl program to translate
that .ncd file to a readable file. Figure 3.4(b) also demonstrates that the hardware Trojan
has been successfully placed in an un-occupied slice. We compared the Trojan resistance
strength of our method and the ATMR approach [13] in the following subsection.
3.4.2 Hardware Trojan Bypass Rate
We validated the proposed HTMD method on the Nexys-3 board. Whenever a Trojan
is detected, the flag light on the board will be turned on as shown in the right side of
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(A) The FPGA Editor
(B) The .xdl file converted from a .ncd file
FIGURE 3.4: FPGA hardware Trojans inserted without disturbing the hard-
ware description file. The modified slice can be observed.
Fig. 3.3. To extensively assess the success rate of different FPGA hardware Trojan detec-
tion methods, we modeled the Trojan insertion and the detection methods in MATLAB.
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ATMR, No.FPGA Slice = 50
Propsoed, No.FPGA Slice = 50
ATMR, No.FPGA Slice = 150
Proposed, No.FPGA Slice = 150
FIGURE 3.5: Hardware Trojan bypass rate versus number of hardware Tro-
jans inserted in the FPGA device.
We randomly selected 10 slices for hardware Trojan insertion. This operation was con-
ducted after the slices for the original design module were configured. The hardware
Trojan bypass rate is defined as the number of incorrect outputs, due to Trojans, over the
number of test cases.
The impact of the number of the hardware Trojans on the Trojan bypass rate is shown
in Fig. 3.5. As can be seen, for the range of 1 to 10 Trojans, the Trojan bypass rate almost
monotonically increases with the number of injected hardware Trojans. As the number
of Trojans increases, the probability for multiple replicas of the functional module simul-
taneously containing Trojans increases. Hence, comparison of the two copies’ outputs
gradually loses the Trojan detection capability, and thus the Trojan bypass rate increases.
We vary the number of FPGA slices to examine the impact of the FPGA size on the
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hardware Trojan bypass rate. In Fig. 3.6, we can observe that the Trojan bypass rate for a
larger FPGA is lower than that for a smaller one. This is because the number of Trojans
placed in the FPGA device is fixed per each FPGA size. The chance for a Trojan slice
colliding with a design slice is higher in a smaller FPGA than in a larger one. The ATMR
method compares the two of three copies for the design module using a fixed algorithm,
which can only resist truly random Trojans. In contrast, our method randomly selects
any two replicas for Trojan detection at runtime; moreover, our method is capable of
assigning each replica to a specific location. Thus, the design location specified by our
method is not predictable to the CAD tool. Hence, the randomness and unpredictability
of our method strengthens the FPGA replacement resistance against the security threats
from the untrusted FPGA manufacturer and CAD tool vendor.
To have a comprehensive view, we plot the Trojan bypass rate versus the FPGA size
and the number of Trojans in Fig. 3.7. As shown, the 3D mesh sheet of our method is
lower than that of the ATMR method [13]. On average, our method reduced the Trojan
bypass rate by 61%.
3.4.3 Overhead on Hardware Cost and Performance
We applied the RPG scheme to the ISCAS’85 benchmark circuits. Because more unused
I/O pins lead to more overhead for pin grounding, we chose the benchmark circuits with
a small number of inputs/outputs. As shown in Table 3.1, the number of utilized LUTs
go as high as 40, whereas the number of occupied slices go up to 16. These hardware
implementations consume 0.044% more LUTs and 0.07% more slices, respectively.
After the FPGA place and route step, we measured the worst-case delay of the c432,
c1355, and c6288 benchmark circuits with and without the proposed HMTD method. As
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FIGURE 3.6: Impact of the number of FPGA slices on hardware Trojan bypass
rate.
TABLE 3.1: FPGA Overhead of Proposed Runtime Pin Grounding
Overhead\Circuits s298 s344 s444 s526 s1488
Increased No. LUTs 40 30 38 40 39
Increased No. Slices 12 6 11 12 16
we mentioned in Section IV.B, we manually added a physical distance between the repli-
cas of the functional module to thwart the Trojan attack from the CAD tool. The induced
separation may result in longer routing interconnects than the baseline. Depending how
the replicas are assigned to the FPGA slices and the amount of distance is added between
two copies, the delay overhead of our method varies. We recorded the minimum and
maximum delay overhead as observed in our case study. As shown in Fig. 3.8, the aver-
age minimum (maximum) delay overhead of HMTD is 37% (70%).
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FIGURE 3.7: Three-dimensional plot for the dependent factors for hardware
Trojan bypass rate.




FPGA-Oriented Moving Target Defense
against Security Threats from Malicious
FPGA Tools
4.1 Motivation
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) enter a rapid growth era due to their attrac-
tive flexibility and CMOS-compatible fabrication process. Because of the high demand
on the FPGA usage in data processing, industrial, automotive, consumer electronics, tele-
com, military & aerospace, FPGA market achieves a compound annual growth rate of
8.4% [31]. Global Market Insights predicts that the FPGA market size is expected to reach
9.98 billion US dollars by 2022 [31]. The increasing popularity of FPGA may drive more
attackers to compromise FPGA-based systems through various channels.
The work [32] highlights that FPGA security embraces four aspects: (1) the secure op-
erations conducted by FPGA devices, (2) the utilization of FPGAs for the system security
enhancement, (3) the secure bitstream delivery to FPGA devices, and (4) the exploitation
29
Chapter 4. FPGA-Oriented Moving Target Defense against Security Threats from
Malicious FPGA Tools
of FPGA devices as an attack surface of FPGA-based systems. The aspects (1) and (2) are
toward the benefits we could obtain by utilizing FPGAs. The programmable features of
FPGAs have been exploited to address the security challenges that ASIC chips are fac-
ing. For example, the embedded FPGA is used to perform locking key authentication [17,
33]. Whereas, FPGAs have their own security vulnerabilities. The surveys [34, 35] and
literatures [17, 36, 37] extensively discuss the aspects (3) and (4). If a FPGA device is
not carefully deployed its security vulnerability would eventually lead the FPGA-based
system to be compromised.
The security threats from malicious FPGA design software is paid much less attention
however, can cause serious problems. Here we use a simple example to demonstrate
how significantly attackers can impact the FPGA configuration through the exploitation
of a FPGA software. First, we connected a Xilinx FPGA board with a monitor through a
VGA cable. Next, we implemented a functional module in the FPGA device to draw a
"chess board" on a screen by sending a VGA signal to the monitor. Our attack goal was
to modify this "chess board" without disturbing the functional module in Verilog and the
user constraints for FPGA configuration.
In the process of the attack, we opened the project with the Xilinx FPGA editor, located
the slice that controls the VGA pins of the board, and then we only modified a single logic
function on that slice. Next, we generated the bitstream for the modified .ncd file output
from the FPGA editor and download the bitstream to the Xilinx FPGA. As a result, the
output picture became white bars, not a chess board. Meanwhile, the width of the bars
is doubled compared to the original picture. The pictures displayed on the monitor for
before and after attacks are shown in Figs. 4.1(a) and (b), respectively. In this demon-
stration, we manually performed the attack behaviors in the FPGA design suite, but the
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(A) Before modification (B) After modification
FIGURE 4.1: Monitor displays (A) before and (B) after modification
attack operations can certainly be implemented in a stand-alone software.
4.1.1 Three Levels of Attacks
More precisely, this work assumes that three levels of attacks can take place due to the
malicious software implanted in the FPGA design suite.
• L-1: Based on attackers’ experiences, an attacker places hardware Trojans in the
most popular FPGA die area. At this level, the attacker does not have to have any
knowledge of the design to be configured on the FPGA.
• L-2: The attacker is able to extract information like which slices are utilized by the
current design from the FPGA placelist. Although the attack at this level does not
analyze the exact function of the design, the attack exploration space is significantly
smaller than the L-1 attacks.
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• L-3: The malicious software can search for the identical portion of the design, which
may be protected with duplication technique, and insert the same Trojan to each
replica. The attack at this level is the most challenging one, but costing the attacker
more resource to guarantee the success of attacks.
4.2 Existing Solutions
Since the security threats associated with FPGAs [4, 13, 34–37] were identified, counter-
measures against those threats receive increasing attention. One category of countermea-
sure is to address the intellectual property (IP) theft issues during the FPGA deployment
phase [11, 27, 32, 35]. Another category is to resist the attacks originated from malicious
FPGA devices [38, 39]. The attacks on FPGAs in the existing work are mainly from un-
trusted IP designers, system integration engineers, or malicious end users [39]. Although
the FPGA vendors [40] adopt bit encryption, authentication, and key/register zeroization
techniques to prevent bitstreams from being tampered, those techniques do not thwart
the design tampering happened before the bitstream is generated by the FPGA software.
There are limited work addressing the security threats from malicious FPGA design soft-
ware, which could harm the integrity of a design running on a SRAM FPGA device [4].
4.3 Proposed Method
We exploit the principle of moving target defense (MTD) as a mean to proactively address
the security threats from malicious FPGA software. Different with the traditional MTD
methods applied in the domain of cyber security, our proposed FPGA-oriented moving
target defense (FOMTD) method explores the unpredictability of the way that a hardware
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design is configured on FPGAs to deter attackers from precisely inserting hardware Tro-
jans. More specifically, the key idea of FOMTD is to make the output of FPGA placement
and routing unpredictable, such that attackers who mounts a malicious program on the
original FPGA design suite cannot easily alter the original implementation on a FPGA.
The proposed FOMTD is implemented by appending commands in user constraints file
and modifying the original Verilog design files.Note, our method does not guarantee to com-
pletely prevent all hardware intrusions but it will increase the difficulty of a Trojan successfully
landing on one (or more) of the FPGA slices occupied by the design.
The desired unpredictability can be achieved by the three defense lines provided by
our method. In the domain of hardware (i.e. FPGA), we exploit the following config-
uration resources to realize the FOMTD method: (i) the availability of multiple replicas
of the intended design, (ii) random selection of one replica for operation at runtime, (iii)
random designation of FPGA slice positions for the selected lookup tables (LUTs), and
(iv) hot-swappable submodules for runtime design assembling.
4.3.1 Defense Line 1 (DFL1): Slice Position Selection through User Con-
straints File
Method description
Instead of using default FPGA setting for placement and routing, we specify the slice po-
sitions on the FPGA die for the selected LUTs, so that the default design mapping on the
FPGA grid can be modified. Figure 4.2 shows the effect of the proposed defense line 1. By
specifying few LUTs (black squares in Fig. 4.2), we change the slice locations for the three
parts of the intended design. This specification can be performed by appending command
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FIGURE 4.2: FPGA mapping modified by proposed defense line 1. Three
parts in different colors represent three partitions of the intended design.
Black squares are three LUT configurations. Proposed defense line 1 alters
the default LUT mapping on the FPGA grid.
to the user constraints file, which is typically used to specify pin and timing constraints.
Note, the selection of slice positions is conducted by FPGA users at the FPGA deployment stage,
which is after the implementation of the malicious FPGA software. Hence, attackers (malicious
software designers) will have hard time to decide where to place effective hardware Tro-
jans. Blindly inserting Trojans may not effectively impact the design on the FPGA.
Case study
We used the ISCAS benchmark circuit c6288 as an example to show the effect of slice
position specification. In the first case, we followed the default setting of the Xilinx ISE
14.1 to generate the placelist for c6288. In the second case, we chose one slice position for
four randomly selected LUTs (we refer this is the single-slice case). In the third case, three
slice locations are designated to twelves LUTs (we refer this is the triple-slice case). We can
observe the design placement details in the FPGA editor, which is available in the Xilinx
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(A) Default setting (B) Single-slice-selection (C) triple-slice selection
FIGURE 4.3: Design placement observed from the Xilinx FPGA editor for (A)
default setting, (B) single-slice selection, and (C) triple-slice selection cases.
design suite.
Figure 4.3 shows the slice occupation results (red dots) for the three cases described
above. From Fig. 4.3 we can see, our defense line 1 indeed significantly changes the design
placement on the FPGA die. To quantify the location difference, we define a metric, non-
similarity rate, to assess the degree of changes that have been made by our defense line 1.
Non-similarity rate represents the ratio of the number of the LUT instances being placed
to a new position due to our method over the total number of slices in use. A higher non-
similarity rate obtained from less number of slice designations is better. In the case study
of c6288, the single-slice case achieves a non-similarity rate of 33.2% and the triple-slice
case increases the non-similarity rate to 35.9%. We expect that more slice specification can
allow us to further improve the non-similarity rate and thus enhance the unpredictability
of slice utilization.
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Theoretical bound for defense line 1 thwarting different Trojan attacks
The baseline below is the original design without any protection. We assume that the
intended baseline design occupies φ slices, the entire FPGA die is composed of Φ user
controllable slices, and the control logic for replica selection is small enough (compared
to φ) to be ignored for the simplicity of analysis. If a hardware Trojan will impact the
design once it is triggered, we call a Trojan Hit. We define the hardware Trojan hit rate,
Γ, as the probability that a randomly-picked slice is indeed one of slices utilized by the
design. If an attacker blindly inserts a hardware Trojan to the FPGA die (i.e., blind attack),
the Trojan hit rate is equal to Eq. (4.1).




When the attacker has knowledge of the commonly used slice area (i.e. L-1 attack),
the target FPGA area will be smaller than the entire FPGA die. We assume ξ ∈ (0, 1) is
the coefficient for how much Trojan insertion space is narrowed by the attacker based on
the attacker’s experience. Hereafter, we name ξ as the space coefficient of Trojan attack.
The non-linear function f(ξ) represents the degree of accuracy regarding whether the real
design placement matches to the attacker’s prediction. Now, the hardware Trojan hit rate
for the design without any protection against L-1 attack is calculated in Eq. (4.2). If f(ξ)
reaches its maximum value, the entire design will be covered in the attack space, and






ξ ∗ Φ (4.2)
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When the L-2 attacker has the knowledge of the detailed slice utilization, each inserted
hardware Trojan will absolutely impact the original design because the Trojan exploration
space is equal to the injection space. This is expressed in Eq. (4.3). As the attacker has








In contrast, our proposed defense line 1 (DFL1) does not use the default FPGA map-
ping settings. Thus, the target FPGA area remains as the entire FPGA die Φ. Our Trojan
hit rate turns to Eq. (4.4). Comparing Eq. (4.2) and Eq. (4.4) we can see that, the de-
nominator of Eq. (4.4) is larger than that in Eq. (4.2). Hence, our defense line 1 reduces
the Trojan hit rate in the scenario of L-1 attack. Once the attacker knows the exact slice
utilization, the proposed defense line 1 cannot thwart L-2 and L-3 attacks.




4.3.2 Defense Line 2 (DFL2): Pseudo-Random Replica Selection
Method description
FPGA has a nature of reconfiguration and redundancy. We exploit this nature to imple-
ment the principle of MTD on FPGAs. The design to be implemented on the FPGA is
first duplicated by n copies. However, only one of the replicas will be active at a time,
and the rest of the replicas are inactive by using input gating technique. The replica se-
lection and input gating are controlled by a pseudo-random selector, which is not a true
random number generator. This is because we only have a limited number of replicas
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FIGURE 4.4: Pseudo-random replica selection provided by the proposed
method.
on the FPGA, and thus the range of the random number is not large. A user-defined ar-
bitrary logic function and a set of external inputs are good enough to pseudo-randomly
choose one of the replicas. Figure 4.4 shows the concept of our defense line 2. Note, in this
defense line, we do not have a comparison logic to examine the consistency among the n
replicas for the purpose of power saving. As the fact that which replica will be active is
determined after the FPGA configuration, an attacker (at L-1) needs to blindly place the
hardware Trojan to the entire FPGA die to make a successful attack.
Theoretical bound for defense line 2 thwarting different Trojan attacks
Figure 4.5 depicts an example of exploration expansion by our proposed defense line
2. A complete design (including replication) consists of multiple units. Because of the
slice position specification, the rough size of the Trojan exploration space SFOMTD can be
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FIGURE 4.5: Hardware Trojan attack exploration space for (a) the design
placement with default FPGA setting, (b) the design protected with FOMTD
defense lines 1 and 2.
expressed by Eq. (4.5).
SFOMTD = max (|Xi −Xj|) ∗max (|Yi − Yj|) (4.5)
Compared to the baseline, our method achieves the theoretical worst-case hardware
Trojan hit rate for L-2 and L-3 attacks as described in Eqs. (4.6) and (4.7), respectively. If L-
2 attacks are taken place in the design, Γbaselinevs. L−2 increases to 1; in contrast, ΓDFL1&2 vs. L−2
remains low due to the expanded Trojan exploration space by the proposed defense line 2.
The exact Trojan hit rate depends on the size of the design unit for duplication, ν. Under
the condition of L-3 attack, our Trojan hit rate will not go beyond 1/n (theoretically the
worst-case hit rate is a uniform distribution of random replica selections). In our simula-
tion section, we observe that the actual Trojan hit rate of our method never reaches this
upper bound due to many random factors.
φ
SFOMTD
6 ΓDFL1&2 vs. L−2 6
φ
n ∗ ν + (φ− ν) (4.6)
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4.3.3 Defense Line 3 (DFL3): Runtime Design Assembling
Method description
Our defense line 3 is the hot-swappable submodule assembling technique, as shown in
Fig. 4.6. We partition the original design into m submodules and each submodule is du-
plicated by n times. In the moment of interest, only one replica of each submodule will be
assembled into a complete design. The pseudo-random selector is utilized to determine
which replica to choose at runtime. After a period of time, the selection of submodule
replicas will be changed without stopping the normal operation (i.e. hot-swappable as-
sembling). The total number of design configurations we can achieve is nm. This large
number of configurations further increases the difficulty for the attacker to recognize the
entire design for attack.
The hot-swappable assembling technique shown in Fig. 4.6 is directly applicable for
combinational circuits. We tailor this technique to make it suitable for sequential circuits.
As shown in Fig. 4.7, two styles are available for the circuit composed of combinational
logic and memory elements. In style I, we do not duplicate the registers, thus the sub-
module assembling technique for combinational and sequential circuits is the same. In
style II, the registers have replicas, too. To realize the hot-swappable feature, we copy
the content of active registers to the hot-swap registers (HS Reg. in Fig. 4.7) before the
runtime submodule swapping happens. Then, we load the value saved in HS Reg. to all
register replicas to resume the operation after runtime submodule swapping.
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FIGURE 4.6: Hot-swappable submodule assembling provided by defense line
3.
FIGURE 4.7: Two styles of applying defense line 3 to sequential circuits.
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Additional option 1: input gating. To thwart L-3 attacks, we could further strengthen
our defense line 3 by loosing the input gating and enabling two complete replicas ac-
tive, such that the two replicas can examine the consistency between their final outputs.
However, the enhanced defense capability comes with more power consumption.
Additional option 2: gate replacing on replicas. To better defeat L-3 attacks, we
enhance our defense line 3 by bringing diversity to the replicas for hot-swappable sub-
modules. In the work [39], the diversity on implementation is introduced by using differ-
ent hard macros, which are obtained by applying different constraint conditions during
FPGA synthesis. Inspired by the work [39], we create hard macros at gate level so that
we have more flexibility to facilitate the implementation of heterogeneous replicas for
submodules. Those gate-level hard macros are used to replace some gates in one of the
replicas. As a result, even if an attacker searches the same FPGA configuration pattern
between two replicas, the success rate of finding two identical copies for Trojan insertion
will be extremely low.
The flowchart for the proposed gate replacing on replicas is depicted in Fig. 4.8. First,
we randomly choose one (or more) type(s) of logic gates, for instance nand (c, a, b), in
one replica. Next, we apply the de Morgan’s laws to replace the chosen gate with other
types of logic gates, while maintaining the same Boolean function. For the 2-input nand
gate, we can replace it with or (c, ∼a, ∼b). Note, all the gate replacement is done in
the Verilog description. To prevent the FPGA synthesis tool from removing our gate
replacement during the logic optimization process, we implement the or (c, ∼a, ∼b) with
three customized hard macros, HM_OR (a¯, b¯, c), HM_NOT (a, a¯) and HM_NOT (b, b¯).
HM_OR and HM_NOT are defined as Verilog modules which will complete the logic OR
and inversion operations. By using hard macros, the gates for replacement can be mapped
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FIGURE 4.8: Gate replacement for the security enhancement of defense line
3.
into one independent slice and they will not be merged with other LUT configuration.
We can conduct gate replacement for one or multiple replicas so that the identical LUT
configurations will be removed. Consequently, our enhanced defense line 3 is capable to
thwart L-3 attacks.
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Theoretical bound for defense line 3 thwarting different Trojan attacks
With respect to L-2 attacks, the attacker knows which slices are occupied by the design but
cannot differentiate which submodule belongs to which replica. Hence, the target slice for
Trojan insertion is not clear. The attacker has to randomly chooses φ slices out of all the
occupied slices n ∗ ν + (φ− ν). Because defense line 3 changes the complete design by re-
assembling the submodules from different replicas, only the Trojan placed in the common
non-duplicated area (φ− ν) will lead to Trojan hit constantly. The corresponding Trojan
hit rate for this scenario is expressed in Eq. (4.8).
ΓDFL3 vs. L−2 =
(φ− ν)
n ∗ ν + (φ− ν) (4.8)
In L-3 attacks, the attacker has full knowledge of which slices are configured for the
design with the defense line 3, but he/she could only form the complete design by guess-
ing which submodule replicas will be used. Without gate replacement, the corresponding
Trojan hit rate is shown in Eq. (4.9).






In which, m and n are the number of submodules per design and the number of de-
sign replicas, respectively. sp is the number of different hot-swapping configurations. As
the proposed defense line 3 changes design configuration over time, there are nm con-
figurations in total and (n− 1)m configurations do not contain the inserted Trojan. The
more swapping happens during the runtime operation, the less Trojan hit rate the attacker
could achieve.
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In the following experiments, we synthesized, placed and routed the Verilog HDL codes
for four ISCAS’85 and ISCAS’89 benchmark circuits through the Xilinx ISE 14.1 design
suite, and generated the corresponding bitstreams. Those bitstreams are specific for a Xil-
inx Spartan-6 XC6SLX16 FPGA. The detailed slice utilization of each circuit was analyzed
by our Python script to extract the occupied FPGA slice positions. We used MATLAB
programs to insert hardware Trojans blindly or purposely (depending on the experiment
goal) and then measured the hardware Trojan hit rate. We assume the Trojan inserted in
the design will be triggered and affect the original design function. The FPGA slice uti-
lization and worst-case delay were obtained from the tools available in the Xilinx design
suite.
4.4.2 Variation on FPGA Slice Utilization
Variation on the position of all the slices occupied by the design is critical to ensure the
high unpredictability of FPGA utilization and the success of our method. Hence, we first
examined the impact of our defense line 1 on the FPGA slice utilization. We compared
the positions (on the FPGA die) of all the slices used by the baseline design and the one
applied user-specified slice designations. The baseline means the original benchmark
circuits without any protection. The non-similarity rate defined in Section V.B.2) is adopted
as a metric for evaluation.
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FIGURE 4.9: Non-similarity rate achieved by proposed defense line 1. Non-
similarity rate between one slice-position designation case and the baseline.
The subscripts 1s and 3s means the location of a single slice or three slices are
specified in the user constraints file for the FPGA implementation. On each
bar, the central mark indicates the median, and the bottom and top edges of
the box indicate the 25th and 75th percentiles, respectively.
As shown in Fig. 4.9, compared to the baseline, our method achieves an average non-
similarity rate in the range of 0.49 to 0.51. This means, on average, about 50% of the LUT
instances for each benchmark circuit being placed to different positions on the FPGA die
due to our defense line 1. We further examined the variation on the different positions of
the occupied slices due to the different designated destinations on the FPGA die.
We repeated the simulation on non-similarity rate for sequential circuits and summa-
rized the median values for all non-similarity rates in Table 4.1. As shown, the proposed
defense line 1 approximately achieves a non-similarity rate of 0.5. The increase on the
number of user specified slice locations only slightly enhances the non-similarity rate.
Each non-similarity rate in Table 4.1 was based on five test cases. According to our case
study, we observe that the difference on the specified slide locations yields the average
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TABLE 4.1: Medians of Non-Similarity Rate
Circuits c4321s c13551s c19081s c62881s Std. deviation
Median 0.49167 0.50595 0.49351 0.49123 0.0070
Circuits c4323s c13553s 19083s c62883s Std. deviation
Median 0.5000 0.50595 0.49351 0.50125 0.0051
Circuits s3442s s5262s s14882s s132072s Std. deviation
Median 0.48333 0.42105 0.4878 0.43367 0.0340
standard deviation on the median value in the range of 0.0070 to 0.034, which is very
small.
4.4.3 Assessment on Attack Resilience
The attack resilience of baseline and our method are compared in the subsections below.
Three attack levels mentioned in Section 4.1.1 are considered in the following assessment.
Hardware Trojan Hit Rate for L-1 Attacks
Recall that attackers who execute L-1 attacks do not know the locations of all the occupied
slides for the design of interest. We varied the range of attack exploration space from 5%
to 50% of the entire FPGA die in the following experiments. Figure 4.10 shows that the
proposed method achieves a lower hardware Trojan hit rate Γ (defined in Section 4.3.2)
than the baseline in a wide range of the attack exploration space. This is because our de-
fense line 1 makes the LUT placement unpredictable and not targetable for L-1 attackers.
The hardware Trojan hit rate for c432, c1908, c6288, s444, and s13207 first increases with
the increasing ξ because f(ξ) ∗ φ in Eq.(4.2), the number of occupied slices falling in the
attack space, grows faster than ξ ∗Φ, the attack space. As the maximum value of f(ξ) is 1,
Γbaseline starts to drop after ξ exceeds a threshold. In our case studies, the ξ thresholds for
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FIGURE 4.10: Hardware Trojan hit rate reduction by proposed defense line 1
applied in the benchmark circuit in the condition of L-1 attacks.
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c432, c1355, c1908, c6288, s444, and s13207 are 15%, 5%, 15%, 25%, 40%, and 35%, respec-
tively. The case of c1355 has a smaller ξ threshold than the other benchmark circuits, so
we do not observe that the corresponding Γbaseline increases with ξ. The hardware Trojan
hit rate of our method increases much slower with the increasing ξ than the baseline. Our
method reduces the hardware Trojan hit rate to 0.213, 0.8272, 0.4114, 0.49, 0.0036, 0.0752
for c432, c1355, c1908, c6288, s444, and s13207, respectively. When the attack exploration
space is large enough to cover the entire design placed on the FPGA die, the Trojan hit
rate of proposed method will be equal to the Trojon hit rate of the baseline eventually.
Hardware Trojan Hit Rate for L-2 Attack
Different with L-1 attacks, L-2 attacks are able to retrieve the exact locations of the oc-
cupied slices. Consequently, the baseline design does not have any resilience against
L-2 attacks. The proposed defense line 2 (DFL2) activates one complete design replica
according to the pseudo-random selection and defense line 3 (DFL3) assembles the hot-
swappable submodules at runtime . Thus, our method further increases the unpredictabil-
ity of the truly activated design copy and achieves a lower Trojan hit rate over the base-
line. As shown in Fig. 4.11(a), the baseline without any protection yields a hardware
Trojan hit rate of 1, which means each triggered Trojan is definitely located in one of the
occupied slices. In contrast, our DFL2 and DFL3 significantly reduce the Trojan hit rate
over the baseline especially for the small number of inserted Trojans. When more Trojans
are placed in the utilized FPGA slices, our Trojan hit rate eventually increases due to the
limited number of design replicas used (we used two replicas in our experiment). If more
copies are available, the slope of the Trojan hit rate will be less than what is shown in
Fig. 4.11(a).
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(B) Seven benchmark circuits
FIGURE 4.11: Hardware Trojan hit rate for (A) c432, and (B) seven benchmark
circuits suffering from four hardware Trojans inserted via L-2 attacks.
We examined the Trojan hit rate for seven benchmark circuits, which suffer from dif-
ferent numbers of Trojan insertions via L-2 attacks. Each hardware Trojan hit rate was
obtained from 10,000 test cases. The average Trojan hit rate of DFL2 (DFL3) is 69% (31%).
As shown in Fig. 4.11(b), the DFL2 reduces the hit rate by up to 40% over the baseline.
The reduction on the Trojan hit rate can be further improved by DFL3 up to 91%.
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Hardware Trojan Hit Rate for L-3 Attack
The L-3 attack can recognize the multiple replicas of the design that will be implemented
on the FPGA by searching for the exact same or approximately similar LUT configuration.
We repeated the same experiments as we did for Section 4.4.3, except a different attack
level. As shown in Fig. 4.12(a), the Trojan hit rate for the design under L-3 attack increase
with the increasing number of Trojans, which is similar with that for the L-2 attack case.
However, the average Trojan hit rate of DFL2 (DFL3) increases to 73% (44%), which is
higher than that resisting L-2 attacks. As shown in Fig. 4.12(b), the DFL2 reduces the hit
rate by up to 35% over the baseline. The reduction on the Trojan hit rate can be further
improved by DFL3 up to 72%.
From Figs. 4.11(b) and 4.12(b), we can also conclude that L-3 attack indeed is more
powerful than L-2 attack. This is due to L-3 attack can search for the matched LUT con-
figuration pattern. We subtracted the Trojan hit rate for DFL3 against L-3 attack from
that against L-2 attacks and calculated the increase on the hit rate in Fig. 4.13. The peak
of Trojan hit rate increase appears at the number of inserted Trojans equal to 2. When
more Trojans are introduced to the design, the increase on Trojan hit rate gradually re-
duces. The reason for this phenomenon is, statistically, the number of exactly matched
LUT configurations due to the application of replicas is approximate to 2. This means, for
some cases in L-3 attack, two hardware Trojans can be respectively placed to two identi-
cally configured LUTs. Thus, those cases can successfully launch the Trojan without being
detected.
Figure 4.14(a) shows that the average number of exactly matched LUT configurations
per each benchmark circuit is close to 100 (i.e. 1). If we search for the LUT configuration
with similar format but different input/out pins (i.e approximate matching), the number of
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(B) Seven benchmark circuits
FIGURE 4.12: Hardware Trojan hit rate for (A) c432, and (B) seven benchmark
circuits suffering from four hardware Trojans inserted via L-3 attacks.
matched cases increases. To address this issue, we apply the gate replacement technique
to the defense line 3. As can be seen from Fig. 4.14(a), our enhanced method can increase
the number of exact matching LUT configurations for two replicas. Now, the same LUT
configurations do not stand for the identical logic function for the benchmark circuit any
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FIGURE 4.13: Increase on hardware Trojan hit rate due to advanced attacks.
more. Therefore, when the attacker performs L-3 attacks, the Trojan hit rate due to L-3
attack can be reduced. Not only increasing the number of exact matching cases, our gate
replacement technique also increases the number of approximate matching patterns, as
shown in Fig. 4.14(b). As a result, our enhanced DFL3 reduces the hardware Trojan (HT)
hit rate. From Fig. 4.15 we can see, the proposed gate replacement technique reduce the
Trojan hit rate for different circuits. On average, our method makes the Trojan hit rate
decrease by 62% and 88% for the attacker searches for exact matching and approximate
matching configures, respectively.
4.4.4 Dependent Design Factors on Trojan Hit Rate
In proposed defense line 3, our method swaps the replicas of submodules at runtime.
We examined the impact of number of hot swaps on the Trojan hit rate. As depicted
in Figs. 4.16(a) and (b), a larger number of hot swaps used in the design yields a lower
hardware Trojan hit rate. However, as the number of inserted hardware Trojans increases,
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FIGURE 4.14: Comparison of number of Trojan hits for without and with gate
replacement to thwart L-3 pattern searching attack. (A) Exact matching and
(B) Approximate matching.






































































FIGURE 4.15: Comparison of hardware Trojan hit rate for without or with
gate replacement to thwart L-3 pattern searching attack. (A) Exact matching
and (B) Approximate matching.
the Trojan hit rate reduced by hot swapping gradually decreases. This conclusion applies
to all benchmark circuits we tested, which is confirmed in Figs. 4.17(a) and (b).
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FIGURE 4.16: Impact of number of hot swaps on hardware Trojan hit rate for
c432 under (A) L-2 attack, and (B) L-3 attack.
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FIGURE 4.17: Impact of number of hot swaps on hardware Trojan hit rate for
seven benchmark circuits affected by four hardware Trojans inserted via (A)
L-2 attack, and (B) L-3 attack.
4.4.5 Assessment on Hardware Cost, Delay and Power
Hardware Utilization
Table 4.2 summarize the number of utilized LUTs for different methods. Since the pro-
posed defense line 1 only changes the location of designated slices, on average, our
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TABLE 4.2: Number of FPGA LUTs utilized by different methods.
Circuits c432 c1355 c1908 c6288 s444 s1488 s13207
Baseline 58 62 58 530 33 117 180
Defense
line 1 58 62 59 530 33 117 181
Defense
line 2 158 156 178 1123 67 261 429
Defense
line 3.G 173 167 216 1157 84 296 443
Defense
line 3.NG 110 158 181 1118 96 259 433
method consumes 0.33% more LUTs than the baseline. In the proposed defense line 2,
we duplicated the design under protection once and utilized a pseudo-random selection
unit for replica selection. The unselected replica is muted through input gating. For the
small circuits, the increase on the LUT utilization could be large due to the relative large
size of pseudo-random selection and input gating. However, the object for protection is
large, the FPGA overhead can be reduced through optimization. The LUT overheads for
the largest combinational circuit c6288 and sequential circuit s13207 in our case studies
are 111.89% and 138.33%, respectively. During the hot-swapping process, the proposed
defense line 3 interleaves multiple sections of the original design and its replica. In ad-
dition to the primary inputs, the input gating technique is also applied to the inputs for
hot-swappable submodules. As a result, the LUT overheads for c6288 and s13207 in-
crease to 116.79% and 145%, respectively. When we remove the input gating (i.e. NG)
option, the corresponding overheads on utilized LUTs for the largest circuits are reduced
to 10.94% and 140.56%, respectively. Certainly, removing the input gating will cost more
power consumption. Although our method (defense line 3) incurs similar LUT utiliza-
tion for double modular redundancy, our runtime replica selection ensures lower power
consumption than DMR and provides good unpredictability.
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TABLE 4.3: FPGA Total Power Consumption (mW) by Different Methods
Circuits Baseline Defense line 2 Defense line 3
c432 10.37 (100%) 11.05 (107%) 11.82 (114%)
c1355 48.66 (100%) 50.56 (104%) 50.56 (104%)
c1908 40.14 (100%) 42.50 (106%) 43.56 (109%)
c6288 217.41 (100%) 232.75 (107%) 233.67 (107%)
s444 20.01 (100%) 21.68 (108%) 21.85 (109%)
s1488 12.50 (100%) 15.25 (122%) 15.56 (124%)
s13207 303.33 (100%) 329.03 (108%) 335.07 (110%)
Power Consumption
We synthesized the Verilog code for the four benchmark circuits in the Synopsys Design
Compiler. The clock frequency was set to 100 MHz for all the designs. We measured the
power consumption in the tool Design Compiler and reported in Table 4.3. On average,
the proposed defense line 2 leads to an increase on total power of 8.86% over the base-
line. Our defense line 3 with input gating provides better resilience against advanced
attacks, at the cost of consuming 11% more total power, on average, than the baseline.
The increased power consumption is due to the pseudo-random selection and input gat-
ing logic, as well as the multiplexers before the final outputs.
Worst-case Delay
We measured the worst-case delays for different designs using the PlanAhead tool in
Xilinx ISE 14.1 design suite. As shown in Table 4.4, slice designation used in the proposed
defense line 1 could lead to more or less worst-case delay, depending on where the slice
is designated. To examine the impact of the slice designation on the worst-case delay, we
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TABLE 4.4: Comparison of worst-case delay. Unit: ns
Circuits c432 c1355 c1908 c6288 s444 s1488 s13207




case 1 5.713 4.677 5.500 10.128 1.314 4.051 3.328
case 2 5.603 4.677 5.458 10.358 1.322 3.997 3.274
case 3 5.549 4.677 5.322 10.18 1.43 3.947 3.274
case 4 5.711 4.622 5.257 10.013 1.322 3.979 3.274
case 5 5.657 4.679 5.278 9.905 1.376 4.049 3.328
+/- delay -1.94%∼0.95% -1.18%∼0 0∼0.49% -1.65%∼1.74% -0.81%∼0 -3.85%∼0 1.62%∼0
triple-slice
designation
case 1 5.607 4.57 5.287 10.234 1.378 4.009 3.272
case 2 5.715 4.731 5.406 9.966 1.378 3.979 3.328
case 3 5.553 4.679 5.335 9.979 1.378 4.049 3.328
case 4 5.661 4.677 5.448 10.51 1.378 4.049 3.328
case 5 5.606 4.669 5.334 9.899 1.322 4.009 3.272
+/- delay -0.96%∼1.93% 0%∼3.52% 0∼3.05% -3.27%∼2.7% -4.06%∼0 -0.75%∼1% 0%∼1.17%


























varied the number of designated slices from 1 to 3, and performed five test cases for each
designation condition. Based on our case studies, the proposed defense line 1 induces
a delay overhead as large as 1.74% and 3.52% for the single-slice designation and triple-
slice designation, respectively. Compared to the baseline, our defense line 2 leads to the
worst-case delay increase in the range of 4.23% to 17.19% for different benchmark circuits.
Due to the hot-swapple logic, the delay overhead induced by the proposed defense line 3
can be as high as 22.02%.
4.4.6 Comparing Proposed FOMTD with Static Trojan Detection Method
In this section, we compare our proposed moving target defense method with a static
Trojan detection method, which is based on double modular redundancy (DMR). The
DMR based static Trojan detection increases the number of LUTs. Even though the at-
tacker who is performing L-2 attacks can see the utilized LUTs, the chance of hitting two
identical LUTs is low. Some Trojans inserted on the replica comparison logic will not be
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FIGURE 4.18: Comparison of hardware Trojan hit rate for proposed defense
line 3 and DMR affected by four Trojans inserted via (A) L-2 and (B) L-3 at-
tacks.
detected by DMR. Therefore, the Trojan hit rate cannot be reduced to zero. When we ad-
vance the attack method to L-3 attack, our defense line 3 effectively reduces the Trojan
hit rate. Together with the runtime hot-swapping feature, fewer number of exact match-
ing LUT configurations available in the netlist of our method benefits us to reduce the
success rate of a Trojan inserted by L-2 and L-3 attacks. Figures 4.18(a) and (b) indicate
that our method achieves a lower Trojan hit rate than DMR. On average, our defense line
3 reduces the Trojan hit rate by 63.25% and 42.51% against L-2 and L-3 attacks, respec-
tively. Indeed, L-3 attack can search for the identical LUT configurations; unfortunately,
the number of exact matching LUT configurations is not high in FPGA mapping (which
is different with ASIC design). Figure 4.19 shows that our defense line 3 can effectively
reduce the number of exact matching cases over DMR. Thus, our defense line 3 obtains a
better attack resilience than DMR. Defense line 3 also reduces the power consumption, as
indicated in Fig. 4.20.
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FIGURE 4.19: Comparison of number of exact matching on LUT configura-
tion.




Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Conclusion
The study and usage of FPGA systems have reached a very high level. FPGAs are able
to work as crucial components to build up large complicated electronic systems and they
have played important roles in the applications of many fields including civil use, indus-
try, military, etc. We should keep sober on the dramatic increasing trend of the popu-
larity of FPGA systems because it can also attract attackers’ attention for high improper
benefits. To protect FPGAs from malicious attack and also maintain a safe operating en-
vironment for them, many defense schemes have been proposed. However, most of the
existing technologies ignore one blind spot in the whole FPGA supply chain, which is
the potential security threat from FPGA design software that is commonly called CAD
tool. In this thesis, we fill the gap to reveal the CAD-based security threats and exploit
the principles of moving target defense to propose a series of countermeasures against
the potential attacks.
In Chapter 3, we validate the feasibility of pin grounding and further extends it to a
runtime scheme. Our method not only grounds the FPGA I/O pins at the configuration
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time, but it also checks the pin status during the operation time. To thwart the FPGA
Trojan configured by an untrusted FPGA vendor or malicious CAD tools, we propose
an HMTD method. In addition to replicating the functional module to replace the obso-
lete component for the legacy system, our method further specifies the relative physical
distance between two replicas in the FPGA user constraint file and performs output com-
parison from two randomly selected replicas. Because the CAD tool cannot foresee the
user constraint file, our method can effectively detect FPGA Trojans inserted by the CAD
tool through implicit settings at the development time of that tool. Our experimental re-
sults show that the proposed HMTD method reduces the hardware Trojan bypass rate by
61% (on average) lower than the existing ATMR method. Our RPG scheme increases the
FPGA utilization rate below 0.1%.
In Chapter 4, we introduce the proposed FOMTD, which is composed of three de-
fense lines to defend three levels of attacks in terms of the level of attacker’s knowledge
to the design. Experiment results show that proposed FOMTD can effectively reduce
the hardware Trojan hit rate with very reasonable overhead. More precisely, defense line
one of FOMTD countermeasure reduces the hardware Trojan hit rate of level one attack
to as low as 0.36% with only 0.33% more LUT consumption. Defense line two further
reduces the Trojan hit rate up to 40% (35%) over the baseline for level two attack (level
three attack) while consumes 14.68% more power. Defense line three reduces the Trojan
hit rate up to 91% (72%) for level two attack (level three attack) with 15.51% more power
cost. For the overhead of worst-case delay, the measurements vary because of the differ-
ent slice designations. However, the highest delay increment for all the test cases is still
under 23%. Comparing to DMR, our proposed defense two consumes less power and
defense three has a better effect in controlling the hardware Trojan hit rate. Furthermore,
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proposed enhancement of losing input gating of defense line three can achieve an even
better security performance and the gate replacing enhancement can significantly miti-
gate the ability of attackers to locate identical locations for multiple-Trojan insertion. On
average, our method makes the Trojan hit rate decrease by 62% and 88% for the attacker
searches for exact matching and approximate matching configures, respectively. When
advanced attacks is further made, our defense lines maintain the hit rate as low as 35%.
Considering the significant improvement on the resilience on Trojan attacks, the overhead
of our method is moderate and acceptable for security critical applications.
5.2 Future Work
5.2.1 Reduce the Delay Overhead Caused by Implementing HMTD
In Chapter 3, we introduced a hardware MTD method to thwart the attacks from mali-
cious CAD tool. One limitation of the scheme is the delay overhead. In the future work,
more attention can be paid to optimize the timing problem of HMTD while keeping the
effect of it on limiting the hardware Trojan bypass rate.
5.2.2 Applying the information of LUT location to bitstream encryp-
tion
In both the countermeasures we introduced in Chapter 3 and 4, LUT location assignment
is an important technique for achieving the effect of protection. In the future study, one
possible defense of encrypting bitstream with physical location information can be tried
to investigate. In this case, the bitstream encrypted by the location information key can
63
Chapter 5. Conclusion and Future Work
and only can be decrypted when running in the FPGA device which is constructed with
the same location information. This “one-to-one" cryptography procedure can get rid of
the transition process of the key and in this way, there is no need to worry about data
leaking during the key propagation.
64
Appendix A
Source Codes for Defense Line 1 of
FPGA-Oriented Moving Target Defense
A.1 Commands in the User Constraints File of Benchmark
Circuit c432
INST "Mxor_N227_xo<0>1" BEL = C5LUT;
INST "Mxor_N227_xo<0>1" LOC = SLICE_X0Y61;
INST "Mxor_N239_xo<0>1" BEL = D5LUT;
INST "Mxor_N239_xo<0>1" LOC = SLICE_X0Y61;
INST "out3_SW0" BEL = B6LUT;
INST "out3_SW0" LOC = SLICE_X0Y61;
INST "out5_SW0" BEL = A6LUT;
INST "out5_SW0" LOC = SLICE_X0Y61;
INST "out181" BEL = D6LUT;
INST "out181" LOC = SLICE_X37Y61;
INST "out1811" BEL = C6LUT;
INST "out1811" LOC = SLICE_X37Y61;
INST "Mxor_N251_xo<0>1" BEL = A6LUT;
INST "Mxor_N251_xo<0>1" LOC = SLICE_X37Y61;
INST "N4211_SW0" BEL = B6LUT;
INST "N4211_SW0" LOC = SLICE_X37Y61;
INST "N3291" BEL = D6LUT;
INST "N3291" LOC = SLICE_X18Y61;
INST "out1814" BEL = C6LUT;
INST "out1814" LOC = SLICE_X18Y61;
INST "N432" BEL = A6LUT;
INST "N432" LOC = SLICE_X18Y61;
INST "Mxor_N247_xo<0>1" BEL = B5LUT;
INST "Mxor_N247_xo<0>1" LOC = SLICE_X18Y61;
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A.2 Commands in the User Constraints File of Benchmark
Circuit c6288
INST "n1143_SW0" BEL = B6LUT;
INST "n1143_SW0" LOC = SLICE_X0Y61;
INST "n1155_SW0" BEL = A6LUT;
INST "n1155_SW0" LOC = SLICE_X0Y61;
INST "n1267" BEL = C6LUT;
INST "n1267" LOC = SLICE_X0Y61;
INST "n1271" BEL = D5LUT;
INST "n1271" LOC = SLICE_X0Y61;
INST "n1145_SW0" BEL = A6LUT;
INST "n1145_SW0" LOC = SLICE_X37Y61;
INST "n1721" BEL = B6LUT;
INST "n1721" LOC = SLICE_X37Y61;
INST "n1273" BEL = C5LUT;
INST "n1273" LOC = SLICE_X37Y61;
INST "n1805" BEL = D5LUT;
INST "n1805" LOC = SLICE_X37Y61;
INST "n1139_SW0" BEL = D6LUT;
INST "n1139_SW0" LOC = SLICE_X18Y61;
INST "n1153_SW0" BEL = C6LUT;
INST "n1153_SW0" LOC = SLICE_X18Y61;
INST "n1265" BEL = B5LUT;
INST "n1265" LOC = SLICE_X18Y61;
INST "n1697" BEL = A6LUT;
INST "n1697" LOC = SLICE_X18Y61;
A.3 Commands in the User Constraints File of Benchmark
Circuit s444
INST "G571" BEL = B5LUT;
INST "G571" LOC = SLICE_X0Y61;
INST "G801" BEL = C6LUT;
INST "G801" LOC = SLICE_X0Y61;
INST "G1111" BEL = D6LUT;
INST "G1111" LOC = SLICE_X0Y61;
INST "G371" BEL = C6LUT;
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INST "G371" LOC = SLICE_X37Y61;
INST "G921" BEL = B6LUT;
INST "G921" LOC = SLICE_X37Y61;
INST "G451" BEL = A6LUT;
INST "G451" LOC = SLICE_X37Y61;
INST "G1101" BEL = C6LUT;
INST "G1101" LOC = SLICE_X18Y61;
INST "G411" BEL = D6LUT;
INST "G411" LOC = SLICE_X18Y61;
INST "G1011" BEL = A6LUT;
INST "G1011" LOC = SLICE_X18Y61;
A.4 Commands in the User Constraints File of Benchmark
Circuit s13207
INST "g43741" BEL = D6LUT;
INST "g43741" LOC = SLICE_X0Y61;
INST "g55371" BEL = C6LUT;
INST "g55371" LOC = SLICE_X0Y61;
INST "g50961" BEL = A6LUT;
INST "g50961" LOC = SLICE_X0Y61;
INST "g56984_SW0" BEL = B6LUT;
INST "g56984_SW0" LOC = SLICE_X0Y61;
INST "g35151" BEL = A6LUT;
INST "g35151" LOC = SLICE_X37Y61;
INST "g35152" BEL = C6LUT;
INST "g35152" LOC = SLICE_X37Y61;
INST "g46761" BEL = B6LUT;
INST "g46761" LOC = SLICE_X37Y61;
INST "g48681" BEL = D6LUT;
INST "g48681" LOC = SLICE_X37Y61;
INST "g56721" BEL = A6LUT;
INST "g56721" LOC = SLICE_X18Y61;
INST "g61201" BEL = B6LUT;
INST "g61201" LOC = SLICE_X18Y61;
INST "g60031" BEL = C5LUT;
INST "g60031" LOC = SLICE_X18Y61;
INST "g64601" BEL = D5LUT;
INST "g64601" LOC = SLICE_X18Y61;
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B.1 Verilog Implementation on Benchmark Circuit c432
module c432_DMRrandom_gating(N1_1, N1_2, N4,N8,N11,N14,N17,N21,N24,N27,
N30,N34,N37,N40,N43,N47,N50,N53,N56,N60,N63,N66,N69,N73,N76,N79,N82,N86,
N89,N92,N95,N99,N102,N105,N108,N112,N115,N223,N329,N370,N421,N430,N431,N432);





c432_basic_gating copy1(sel & N1_1,sel & N4,sel & N8,sel & N11,sel & N14,sel & N17,sel
& N21,sel & N24,sel & N27,sel & N30,sel & N34,sel & N37,sel & N40,sel & N43,sel &
N47,sel & N50,sel & N53,sel & N56,sel & N60,sel & N63,sel & N66,sel & N69,sel & N73,sel
& N76,sel & N79,sel & N82,sel & N86,sel & N89,sel & N92,sel & N95, sel & N99,sel &
N102,sel & N105,sel & N108,sel & N112,sel & N115, N223_1, N329_1, N370_1, N421_1,
N430_1, N431_1, N432_1);
c432_basic_gating copy2(∼sel & N1_2,∼sel & N4,∼sel & N8,∼sel & N11,∼sel & N14,∼sel
& N17,∼sel & N21,∼sel & N24,∼sel & N27,∼sel & N30,∼sel & N34,∼sel & N37,∼sel
& N40,∼sel & N43,∼sel & N47,∼sel & N50,∼sel & N53,∼sel & N56,∼sel & N60,∼sel
& N63,∼sel & N66,∼sel & N69,∼sel & N73,∼sel & N76,∼sel & N79,∼sel & N82,∼sel
& N86,∼sel & N89,∼sel & N92,∼sel & N95,∼sel & N99,∼sel & N102,∼sel & N105,∼sel
& N108,∼sel & N112,∼sel & N115, N223_2, N329_2, N370_2, N421_2, N430_2, N431_2,
N432_2);
assign sel = N8 ∧ N60;
assign N223 = sel? N223_1 : N223_2;
assign N329 = sel? N329_1 : N329_2;
assign N370 = sel? N370_1 : N370_2;
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assign N421 = sel? N421_1 : N421_2;
assign N430 = sel? N430_1 : N430_2;
assign N431 = sel? N431_1 : N431_2;
assign N432 = sel? N432_1 : N432_2;
endmodule
B.2 Verilog Implementation on Benchmark Circuit s444













s444_bench_gating copy1( blif_clk_net, blif_reset_net, sel & G0_1, sel & G1, sel & G2,
G118_1, G167_1, G107_1, G119_1, G168_1, G108_1);
s444_bench_gating copy2( blif_clk_net, blif_reset_net, ∼sel & G0_2, ∼sel & G1, ∼sel &




if (blif_reset_net == 1’b1)
SEL = 0;
else
SEL = G1 ∧ G2;
end
assign sel = SEL;
assign G118 = sel? G118_1 : G118_2;
assign G167 = sel? G167_1 : G167_2;
assign G107 = sel? G107_1 : G107_2;
assign G119 = sel? G119_1 : G119_2;
assign G168 = sel? G168_1 : G168_2;
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Source Codes for Defense Line 3 of
FPGA-Oriented Moving Target Defense
C.1 Verilog Implementation on Benchmark Circuit c432
C.1.1 Top-Level Control Logic













c432_submod_gating_4 copy1(copysel & N1_1,copysel & N4,copysel & N8,copysel & N11,
copysel & N14,copysel & N17,copysel & N21,copysel & N24,copysel & N27,copysel &
N30, copysel & N34,copysel & N37,copysel & N40,copysel & N43,copysel & N47,copysel
& N50,copysel & N53,copysel & N56,copysel & N60,copysel & N63, copysel & N66,copysel
& N69,copysel & N73,copysel & N76,copysel & N79,copysel & N82,copysel & N86,copysel
& N89,copysel & N92,copysel & N95, copysel & N99,copysel & N102,copysel & N105,
copysel & N108,copysel & N112,copysel & N115, N223_1, N329_1, N370_1, N421_1, N430_1,
N431_1, N432_1, sel, copysel, NodeOut2, NodeOut1);
c432_submod_gating_4 copy2(∼copysel & N1_2,∼copysel & N4,∼copysel & N8,∼copysel
& N11,∼copysel & N14,∼copysel & N17,∼copysel & N21,∼copysel & N24,∼copysel &
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N27,∼copysel & N30, ∼copysel & N34,∼copysel & N37,∼copysel & N40,∼copysel &
N43,∼copysel & N47,∼copysel & N50,∼copysel & N53,∼copysel & N56,∼copysel & N60,
∼copysel & N63, ∼copysel & N66,∼copysel & N69,∼copysel & N73,∼copysel & N76,
∼copysel & N79,∼copysel & N82,∼copysel & N86,∼copysel & N89,∼copysel & N92,
∼copysel & N95, ∼copysel & N99,∼copysel & N102,∼copysel & N105,∼copysel & N108,
∼copysel & N112,∼copysel & N115, N223_2, N329_2, N370_2, N421_2, N430_2, N431_2,
N432_2, sel, ∼copysel, NodeOut1, NodeOut2);
assign sel[0]= N34 & N37;
assign sel[1]= N63 ∧ N66;
assign sel[2]= N56 ∧ N60;
assign sel[3]= N73 ∼∧ N76;
assign copysel = N8 ∧ N60;
wire [6:0] copy1out, copy2out;
assign copy1out = {N223_1, N329_1, N370_1, N421_1, N430_1, N431_1, N432_1};
assign copy2out = {N223_2, N329_2, N370_2, N421_2, N430_2, N431_2, N432_2};








module c432_submod_gating_4 (N1,N4,N8,N11,N14,N17,N21,N24,N27,N30, N34,N37,
N40,N43,N47,N50,N53,N56,N60,N63, N66,N69,N73,N76,N79,N82,N86,N89,N92,N95,
N99, N102,N105,N108,N112,N115,N223,N329,N370,N421, N430,N431,N432, sel, copysel,
NodeIn, NodeOut);
input N1,N4,N8,N11,N14,N17,N21,N24,N27,N30, N34,N37,N40,N43,N47,N50,N53,N56,


























assign NodeOut = {N425_current, N344_current, N194_current, N118_current};
‘endif
‘ifdef CASE2
assign NodeOut ={N428_current, N345_current, N195_current, N119_current};
‘endif
‘ifdef CASE3
assign NodeOut = {N429_current, N346_current, N196_current, N122_current};
‘endif
‘ifdef CASE4
assign NodeOut = {N430_current, N347_current, N197_current, N123_current};
‘endif
‘ifdef CASE5
assign NodeOut = {N431_current, N348_current, N198_current, N126_current};
‘endif
assign SelectedNode[0] = copysel & (sel[0]? NodeOut[0] : NodeIn[0]);
assign SelectedNode[1] = copysel & (sel[1]? NodeOut[1] : NodeIn[1]);
assign SelectedNode[2] = copysel & (sel[2]? NodeOut[2] : NodeIn[2]);
assign SelectedNode[3] = copysel & (sel[3]? NodeOut[3] : NodeIn[3]);
‘ifdef CASE1
assign N118 = SelectedNode[0];
assign N194 = SelectedNode[1];
assign N344 = SelectedNode[2];
assign N425 = SelectedNode[3];
‘endif
‘ifdef CASE2
assign N119 = SelectedNode[0];
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assign N195 = SelectedNode[1];
assign N345 = SelectedNode[2];
assign N428 = SelectedNode[3];
‘endif
‘ifdef CASE3
assign N122 = SelectedNode[0];
assign N196 = SelectedNode[1];
assign N346 = SelectedNode[2];
assign N429 = SelectedNode[3];
‘endif
‘ifdef CASE4
assign N123 = SelectedNode[0];
assign N197 = SelectedNode[1];
assign N347 = SelectedNode[2];
assign N430 = SelectedNode[3];
‘endif
‘ifdef CASE5
assign N126 = SelectedNode[0];
assign N198 = SelectedNode[1];
assign N348 = SelectedNode[2];
assign N431 = SelectedNode[3];
‘endif
‘ifdef CASE1
not NOT1_1 (N118_current, N1);
‘else
not NOT1_1 (N118, N1);
‘endif
‘ifdef CASE2
not NOT1_2 (N119_current, N4);
‘else
not NOT1_2 (N119, N4);
‘endif
‘ifdef CASE3
not NOT1_3 (N122_current, N11);
‘else
not NOT1_3 (N122, N11);
‘endif
‘ifdef CASE4
not NOT1_4 (N123_current, N17);
‘else
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not NOT1_4 (N123, N17);
‘endif
‘ifdef CASE5
not NOT1_5 (N126_current, N24);
‘else
not NOT1_5 (N126, N24);
‘endif
not NOT1_6 (N127, N30);
not NOT1_7 (N130, N37);
not NOT1_8 (N131, N43);
not NOT1_9 (N134, N50);
not NOT1_10 (N135, N56);
not NOT1_11 (N138, N63);
not NOT1_12 (N139, N69);
not NOT1_13 (N142, N76);
not NOT1_14 (N143, N82);
not NOT1_15 (N146, N89);
not NOT1_16 (N147, N95);
not NOT1_17 (N150, N102);
not NOT1_18 (N151, N108);
nand NAND2_19 (N154, N118, N4);
nor NOR2_20 (N157, N8, N119);
nor NOR2_21 (N158, N14, N119);
nand NAND2_22 (N159, N122, N17);
nand NAND2_23 (N162, N126, N30);
nand NAND2_24 (N165, N130, N43);
nand NAND2_25 (N168, N134, N56);
nand NAND2_26 (N171, N138, N69);
nand NAND2_27 (N174, N142, N82);
nand NAND2_28 (N177, N146, N95);
nand NAND2_29 (N180, N150, N108);
nor NOR2_30 (N183, N21, N123);
nor NOR2_31 (N184, N27, N123);
nor NOR2_32 (N185, N34, N127);
nor NOR2_33 (N186, N40, N127);
nor NOR2_34 (N187, N47, N131);
nor NOR2_35 (N188, N53, N131);
nor NOR2_36 (N189, N60, N135);
nor NOR2_37 (N190, N66, N135);
nor NOR2_38 (N191, N73, N139);
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nor NOR2_39 (N192, N79, N139);
nor NOR2_40 (N193, N86, N143);
‘ifdef CASE1
nor NOR2_41 (N194_current, N92, N143);
‘else
nor NOR2_41 (N194, N92, N143);
‘endif
‘ifdef CASE2
nor NOR2_42 (N195_current, N99, N147);
‘else
nor NOR2_42 (N195, N99, N147);
‘endif
‘ifdef CASE3
nor NOR2_43 (N196_current, N105, N147);
‘else
nor NOR2_43 (N196, N105, N147);
‘endif
‘ifdef CASE4
nor NOR2_44 (N197_current, N112, N151);
‘else
nor NOR2_44 (N197, N112, N151);
‘endif
‘ifdef CASE5
nor NOR2_45 (N198_current, N115, N151);
‘else
nor NOR2_45 (N198, N115, N151);
‘endif
and AND9_46 (N199, N154, N159, N162, N165, N168, N171, N174, N177, N180);
not NOT1_47 (N203, N199);
not NOT1_48 (N213, N199);
not NOT1_49 (N223, N199);
xor XOR2_50 (N224, N203, N154);
xor XOR2_51 (N227, N203, N159);
xor XOR2_52 (N230, N203, N162);
xor XOR2_53 (N233, N203, N165);
xor XOR2_54 (N236, N203, N168);
xor XOR2_55 (N239, N203, N171);
nand NAND2_56 (N242, N1, N213);
xor XOR2_57 (N243, N203, N174);
nand NAND2_58 (N246, N213, N11);
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xor XOR2_59 (N247, N203, N177);
nand NAND2_60 (N250, N213, N24);
xor XOR2_61 (N251, N203, N180);
nand NAND2_62 (N254, N213, N37);
nand NAND2_63 (N255, N213, N50);
nand NAND2_64 (N256, N213, N63);
nand NAND2_65 (N257, N213, N76);
nand NAND2_66 (N258, N213, N89);
nand NAND2_67 (N259, N213, N102);
nand NAND2_68 (N260, N224, N157);
nand NAND2_69 (N263, N224, N158);
nand NAND2_70 (N264, N227, N183);
nand NAND2_71 (N267, N230, N185);
nand NAND2_72 (N270, N233, N187);
nand NAND2_73 (N273, N236, N189);
nand NAND2_74 (N276, N239, N191);
nand NAND2_75 (N279, N243, N193);
nand NAND2_76 (N282, N247, N195);
nand NAND2_77 (N285, N251, N197);
nand NAND2_78 (N288, N227, N184);
nand NAND2_79 (N289, N230, N186);
nand NAND2_80 (N290, N233, N188);
nand NAND2_81 (N291, N236, N190);
nand NAND2_82 (N292, N239, N192);
nand NAND2_83 (N293, N243, N194);
nand NAND2_84 (N294, N247, N196);
nand NAND2_85 (N295, N251, N198);
and AND9_86 (N296, N260, N264, N267, N270, N273, N276, N279, N282, N285);
not NOT1_87 (N300, N263);
not NOT1_88 (N301, N288);
not NOT1_89 (N302, N289);
not NOT1_90 (N303, N290);
not NOT1_91 (N304, N291);
not NOT1_92 (N305, N292);
not NOT1_93 (N306, N293);
not NOT1_94 (N307, N294);
not NOT1_95 (N308, N295);
not NOT1_96 (N309, N296);
not NOT1_97 (N319, N296);
not NOT1_98 (N329, N296);
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xor XOR2_99 (N330, N309, N260);
xor XOR2_100 (N331, N309, N264);
xor XOR2_101 (N332, N309, N267);
xor XOR2_102 (N333, N309, N270);
nand NAND2_103 (N334, N8, N319);
xor XOR2_104 (N335, N309, N273);
nand NAND2_105 (N336, N319, N21);
xor XOR2_106 (N337, N309, N276);
nand NAND2_107 (N338, N319, N34);
xor XOR2_108 (N339, N309, N279);
nand NAND2_109 (N340, N319, N47);
xor XOR2_110 (N341, N309, N282);
nand NAND2_111 (N342, N319, N60);
xor XOR2_112 (N343, N309, N285);
‘ifdef CASE1
nand NAND2_113 (N344_current, N319, N73);
‘else
nand NAND2_113 (N344, N319, N73);
‘endif
‘ifdef CASE2
nand NAND2_114 (N345_current, N319, N86);
‘else
nand NAND2_114 (N345, N319, N86);
‘endif
‘ifdef CASE3
nand NAND2_115 (N346_current, N319, N99);
‘else
nand NAND2_115 (N346, N319, N99);
‘endif
‘ifdef CASE4
nand NAND2_116 (N347_current, N319, N112);
‘else
nand NAND2_116 (N347, N319, N112);
‘endif
‘ifdef CASE5
nand NAND2_117 (N348_current, N330, N300);
‘else
nand NAND2_117 (N348, N330, N300);
‘endif
nand NAND2_118 (N349, N331, N301);
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nand NAND2_119 (N350, N332, N302);
nand NAND2_120 (N351, N333, N303);
nand NAND2_121 (N352, N335, N304);
nand NAND2_122 (N353, N337, N305);
nand NAND2_123 (N354, N339, N306);
nand NAND2_124 (N355, N341, N307);
nand NAND2_125 (N356, N343, N308);
and AND9_126 (N357, N348, N349, N350, N351, N352, N353, N354, N355, N356);
not NOT1_127 (N360, N357);
not NOT1_128 (N370, N357);
nand NAND2_129 (N371, N14, N360);
nand NAND2_130 (N372, N360, N27);
nand NAND2_131 (N373, N360, N40);
nand NAND2_132 (N374, N360, N53);
nand NAND2_133 (N375, N360, N66);
nand NAND2_134 (N376, N360, N79);
nand NAND2_135 (N377, N360, N92);
nand NAND2_136 (N378, N360, N105);
nand NAND2_137 (N379, N360, N115);
nand NAND4_138 (N380, N4, N242, N334, N371);
nand NAND4_139 (N381, N246, N336, N372, N17);
nand NAND4_140 (N386, N250, N338, N373, N30);
nand NAND4_141 (N393, N254, N340, N374, N43);
nand NAND4_142 (N399, N255, N342, N375, N56);
nand NAND4_143 (N404, N256, N344, N376, N69);
nand NAND4_144 (N407, N257, N345, N377, N82);
nand NAND4_145 (N411, N258, N346, N378, N95);
nand NAND4_146 (N414, N259, N347, N379, N108);
not NOT1_147 (N415, N380);
and AND8_148 (N416, N381, N386, N393, N399, N404, N407, N411, N414);
not NOT1_149 (N417, N393);
not NOT1_150 (N418, N404);
not NOT1_151 (N419, N407);
not NOT1_152 (N420, N411);
nor NOR2_153 (N421, N415, N416);
nand NAND2_154 (N422, N386, N417);
‘ifdef CASE1
nand NAND4_155 (N425_current, N386, N393, N418, N399);
‘else
nand NAND4_155 (N425, N386, N393, N418, N399);
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‘endif
‘ifdef CASE2
nand NAND3_156 (N428_current, N399, N393, N419);
‘else
nand NAND3_156 (N428, N399, N393, N419);
‘endif
‘ifdef CASE3
nand NAND4_157 (N429_current, N386, N393, N407, N420);
‘else
nand NAND4_157 (N429, N386, N393, N407, N420);
‘endif
‘ifdef CASE4
nand NAND4_158 (N430_current, N381, N386, N422, N399);
‘else
nand NAND4_158 (N430, N381, N386, N422, N399);
‘endif
‘ifdef CASE5
nand NAND4_159 (N431_current, N381, N386, N425, N428);
‘else
nand NAND4_159 (N431, N381, N386, N425, N428);
‘endif
nand NAND4_160 (N432, N381, N422, N425, N429);
endmodule
C.2 Verilog Implementation on Benchmark Circuit S444
C.2.1 Top-Level Control Logic
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output G108);




s444_submod_gating_4 copy1( blif_clk_net, blif_reset_net, ∼copysel & G0_1, ∼copysel
& G1, ∼copysel & G2, G118_1, G167_1, G107_1, G119_1, G168_1, G108_1, ∼copysel,
NodeIn, NodeOut, sel);
s444_submod_gating_4 copy2( blif_clk_net, blif_reset_net, copysel & G0_2, copysel & G1,
















SEL[2] = G1 | G2;
SEL[3] = G1 ∧ G2;
COPYSEL = G1 ∧ G2;
end
end
assign sel = SEL;
assign copysel = COPYSEL;
assign G118 = copysel? G118_2 : G118_1;
assign G167 = copysel? G167_2 : G167_1;
assign G107 = copysel? G107_2 : G107_1;
assign G119 = copysel? G119_2 : G119_1;
assign G168 = copysel? G168_2 : G168_1;
assign G108 = copysel? G108_2 : G108_1;
endmodule
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C.2.2 Modified Instance
module s444_submod_gating_4( blif_clk_net, blif_reset_net, G0, G1, G2, G118, G167, G107,






























































































































































































































assign NodeOut = G104_current, IIII304_current, G73_current, G140_current;
assign G140 = copysel & (sel[0]? NodeIn[0] : NodeOut[0]);
assign G73 = copysel & (sel[1]? NodeIn[1] : NodeOut[1]);
assign IIII304 = copysel & (sel[2]? NodeIn[2] : NodeOut[2]);
assign G104 = copysel & (sel[3]? NodeIn[3] : NodeOut[3]);
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assign IIII212 = ((∼G51))|((∼IIII210));
assign G50 = ((∼G52));
assign G95 = ((∼G76)&(∼G77)&(∼G78)&(∼G79));
assign IIII211 = ((∼G14))|((∼IIII210));
assign IIII192 = ((∼G43))|((∼IIII190));
assign G120 = ((∼G150))|((∼G128));
assign G167 = ((∼G29));
assign IIII272 = ((∼G19))|((∼IIII271));
assign G79 = ((∼G97));
assign G138 = (G136)|(G142);
assign G61 = ((∼IIII226))|((∼IIII227));
//assign G140 = (G24)|(G21)|(G20)|(G150);
assign G140_current = (G24)|(G21)|(G20)|(G150);
assign G161 = ((∼G17));
assign IIII201 = ((∼G13))|((∼IIII200));
assign G77 = ((∼G20));
assign G93 = ((∼G74)&(∼G79)&(∼G75));
assign IIII283 = ((∼G86))|((∼IIII281));
assign IIII190 = ((∼G12))|((∼G43));
assign G137 = (G136)|(G20)|(G19);
assign G105 = (G102)|(G103);
assign G165 = ((∼G148))|((∼G149));
assign G144 = ((∼G21));
assign G129 = ((∼G19))|((∼G135));
assign IIII226 = ((∼G15))|((∼IIII225));
assign IIII281 = ((∼G20))|((∼G86));
assign IIII372 = ((∼G0));
assign G134 = (G152)|(G142)|(G21);
assign IIII235 = ((∼G16))|((∼G64));
assign G147 = (G152)|(G144);
assign G146 = (G152)|(G143);
assign G41 = ((∼G98)&(∼G42)&(∼G152));
assign G83 = ((∼IIII272))|((∼IIII273));
assign G160 = ((∼IIII382));
assign G35 = ((∼G12));
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assign G122 = (G24&G121);
assign G80 = ((∼G93)&(∼G81)&(∼G152));
assign G117 = ((∼G145))|((∼G146))|((∼G147));
assign G151 = ((∼G20))|((∼G144))|((∼G143))|((∼G139));
assign G132 = ((∼G133))|((∼G134));
assign G158 = (G31)|(G160);
assign G65 = ((∼IIII236))|((∼IIII237));
assign G81 = ((∼G83));
assign G113 = ((∼G163)&(∼G164));
//assign G73 = ((∼IIII256))|((∼IIII257));
assign G73_current = ((∼IIII256))|((∼IIII257));
assign G58 = ((∼G97)&(∼G59)&(∼G152));
assign IIII181 = ((∼G11))|((∼IIII180));
assign G163 = (G161&G165&G162);
assign G148 = ((∼G150))|((∼G135))|((∼G132));
assign G43 = ((∼G34));
assign IIII271 = ((∼G19))|((∼G82));
assign IIII392 = ((∼G30));
assign G114 = ((∼G150)&(∼G151));
assign G153 = ((∼G152));
assign G85 = ((∼G87));
assign G115 = (G161&G117&G162);
assign G74 = ((∼G22));
assign G103 = ((∼G106));
assign IIII202 = ((∼G47))|((∼IIII200));
assign G51 = ((∼G34)&(∼G35)&(∼G36));
assign IIII236 = ((∼G16))|((∼IIII235));
assign G49 = ((∼G98)&(∼G50)&(∼G152));
assign IIII246 = ((∼G17))|((∼IIII245));
assign G118 = ((∼IIII336));
assign G157 = ((∼G160));
assign G130 = ((∼G143)&(∼G152));
assign G54 = ((∼G15)&(∼G16)&(∼G17));
assign G67 = ((∼G69));
assign G42 = ((∼G44));
assign G107 = ((∼IIII321));
assign IIII182 = ((∼IIII180));
assign G87 = ((∼IIII282))|((∼IIII283));
assign G71 = ((∼G73));
assign G69 = ((∼IIII246))|((∼IIII247));
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assign G90 = ((∼G76)&(∼G77)&(∼G79));
assign IIII255 = ((∼G18))|((∼G72));
assign G126 = (G139&G21);
assign IIII321 = ((∼G25));
assign G75 = ((∼G19)&(∼G20)&(∼G21));
assign G47 = ((∼G34)&(∼G35));
assign G111 = ((∼G140))|((∼G141))|((∼G139));
assign G142 = ((∼G22));
//assign IIII304 = ((∼G95))|((∼IIII302));
assign IIII304_current = ((∼G95))|((∼IIII302));
assign G40 = ((∼IIII181))|((∼IIII182));
assign IIII180 = ((∼G11));
assign IIII318 = ((∼G2));
assign G101 = (G100&G99);
assign G57 = ((∼G31)&(∼G98));
assign G121 = ((∼G19))|((∼G135))|((∼G142))|((∼G136));
assign IIII225 = ((∼G15))|((∼G60));
assign G166 = ((∼G162));
assign G149 = ((∼G131))|((∼G130));
assign G159 = (G156)|(G157);
assign IIII256 = ((∼G18))|((∼IIII255));
assign G33 = ((∼G11)&(∼G12)&(∼G13));
assign IIII200 = ((∼G13))|((∼G47));
assign G139 = ((∼G152));
assign G109 = ((∼G122)&(∼G123));
assign IIII257 = ((∼G72))|((∼IIII255));
assign G162 = ((∼G120))|((∼G149));
assign G164 = (G165&G166);
assign IIII293 = ((∼G90))|((∼IIII291));
assign G68 = ((∼G55)&(∼G56)&(∼G57));
assign IIII291 = ((∼G21))|((∼G90));
assign G37 = ((∼G98)&(∼G38)&(∼G152));
assign G145 = (G152)|(G142)|(G20)|(G19);
assign G66 = ((∼G97)&(∼G67)&(∼G152));
assign G136 = ((∼G23));
assign IIII191 = ((∼G12))|((∼IIII190));
assign G125 = (G139&G20&G19);
assign G141 = (G24)|(G22)|(G21);
assign G123 = ((∼G137))|((∼G138))|((∼G21))|((∼G139));
assign G168 = ((∼IIII392));
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assign IIII273 = ((∼G82))|((∼IIII271));
assign IIII105 = ((∼G162));
assign IIII292 = ((∼G21))|((∼IIII291));
assign G155 = (G154&G153);
assign G56 = ((∼G16));
assign G44 = ((∼IIII191))|((∼IIII192));
assign G128 = ((∼G20)&(∼G144)&(∼G136)&(∼G152));
assign G46 = ((∼G48));
assign G94 = ((∼G96));
assign G91 = ((∼IIII292))|((∼IIII293));
assign G59 = ((∼G61));
assign G97 = ((∼G53)&(∼G57)&(∼G54));
assign IIII210 = ((∼G14))|((∼G51));
assign G62 = ((∼G97)&(∼G63)&(∼G152));
assign G102 = ((∼G23));
assign G150 = ((∼G19));
//assign G104 = (G23)|(G106);
assign G104_current = (G23)|(G106);
assign IIII227 = ((∼G60))|((∼IIII225));
assign G99 = ((∼G152));
assign G152 = ((∼IIII372));
assign G135 = ((∼G20));
assign G116 = (G117&G166);
assign G112 = ((∼G115)&(∼G116));
assign G60 = ((∼G57));
assign G82 = ((∼G79));
assign G64 = ((∼G55)&(∼G57));
assign IIII237 = ((∼G64))|((∼IIII235));
assign G84 = ((∼G93)&(∼G85)&(∼G152));
assign G86 = ((∼G76)&(∼G79));
assign IIII382 = ((∼G1));
assign G92 = ((∼G93)&(∼G94)&(∼G152));
assign G34 = ((∼G11));
assign IIII245 = ((∼G17))|((∼G68));
assign IIII336 = ((∼G27));
assign G162BF = ((∼IIII105));
assign G45 = ((∼G98)&(∼G46)&(∼G152));
assign G89 = ((∼G91));
assign IIII324 = ((∼G26));
assign G76 = ((∼G19));
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assign G98 = ((∼G32)&(∼G33));
assign G72 = ((∼G55)&(∼G56)&(∼G161)&(∼G57));
assign G63 = ((∼G65));
assign G55 = ((∼G15));
assign G133 = (G152)|(G136)|(G22)|(G144);
assign G78 = ((∼G21));
assign G96 = ((∼IIII303))|((∼IIII304));
assign G38 = ((∼G40));
assign G127 = (G139&G24);
assign IIII247 = ((∼G68))|((∼IIII245));
assign G53 = ((∼G18));
assign G48 = ((∼IIII201))|((∼IIII202));
assign G36 = ((∼G13));
assign G156 = ((∼G31));
assign G108 = ((∼IIII324));
assign G110 = ((∼G124)&(∼G125)&(∼G126)&(∼G127));
assign G88 = ((∼G93)&(∼G89)&(∼G152));
assign G32 = ((∼G14));
assign IIII302 = ((∼G22))|((∼G95));
assign G119 = ((∼G28));
assign G131 = (G144)|(G22)|(G23)|(G129);
assign IIII282 = ((∼G20))|((∼IIII281));
assign G143 = ((∼G24));
assign G100 = (G104&G105);
assign G70 = ((∼G97)&(∼G71)&(∼G152));
assign IIII303 = ((∼G22))|((∼IIII302));
assign G154 = (G158&G159);
assign G52 = ((∼IIII211))|((∼IIII212));
assign G124 = (G139&G22&G150);
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